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NAFTA's Labor Side Accord: 
A Three-Year Accounting 
Lance Compa* 
The North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC)1 emerged from a 
promise Bill Clinton made during the 1992 presidential campaign against George Bush. 
During 1990-1992 President Bush negotiated the North American Free Trade Agreement2 
NAFTA with President Carlos Salinas of Mexico and Prime Minister Brian Mulroney of 
Canada. In August, 1992, the three leaders announced agreement on NAFTA just as the 
U.S. presidential race was heating up. 
Labor, environmental, and human rights organizations pressured candidate Clinton 
to repudiate NAFTA in his campaign for the presidency. NAFTA critics charged that the 
agreement reflected a neoliberal agenda favoring multinational corporations and investors 
at the expense of workers and the environment.3 In response, Clinton opted to support 
NAFTA if "side agreements" dealing with labor and environmental matters became part of 
the package presented to Congress for approval.4 After taking office in January, 1993, the 
new Clinton Administration proceeded to negotiate the side deals with Mexico and 
Canada. In August, 1993, agreements were reached on the NAALC and a companion envi-
ronmental accord, the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation 
(NAAEC). In November, 1993, the U.S. Congress approved NAFTA and the two side 
agreements. The three accords took effect January 1,1994. 
* Director of Labor Law & Economic Research, Secretariat of the NAFTA Commission for Labor 
Cooperation, Dallas, Texas. After June 1,1997, Professor Compa will be Senior Lecturer at the 
Cornell University School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Ithaca, New York. 
1. North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, Sept. 14, 1993, U.S. Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M. 
1499 [hereinafter NAALC]. 
2. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17,1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 321.L.M. 605. 
3. See Ian Robinson, North American Trade As If Democracy Mattered: What's Wrong With NAFTA 
and What Are the Alternatives, INTERNATIONAL LABOR RIGHTS FUND (1993); Peter T. Kilborn, 
Unions Gird for War Over Trade Pact, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1993, at A14; Keith Schneider, 
Environment Groups Are Split on Support for Free-Trade Pact, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16,1993, at Al. 
4. Clinton's position was spelled out in a major campaign speech advertised as his definitive cam-
paign statement on trade policy. See Governor Bill Clinton, Expanding Trade and Creating 
American Jobs, Address at North Carolina State University, Raleigh, North Carolina (1992). 
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I. Structure and Functioning. 
To understand the NAALC one must see what it is not. 
First, the NAACL is not an agreement that sets forth new standards to which countries 
must conform by harmonizing their laws or their standards and regulations. Instead, the 
NAALC stresses sovereignty in each country's internal labor affairs, recognizing "the right 
of each Party to establish its own domestic labor standards."5 Second, the NAALC does 
not create a new labor rights enforcement agency to supplant the domestic authorities of 
each country. NAALC negotiators took pains to declare that "nothing in this Agreement 
shall be construed to empower a Party's authorities to undertake law enforcement activi-
ties in the territory of another Party."6 Third, the NAALC does not create a supranational 
tribunal to receive evidence in order to decide the guilt or innocence of employers involved 
in labor disputes or to order remedies against violators. Domestic authorities retain this 
power. Instead, the NAALC countries created a system for mutual review of labor matters 
and labor law enforcement in defined areas of labor law. These reviews are conducted first 
by each other, and then, depending on the subject area, by independent, non-governmen-
tal evaluation committees or arbitral panels. 
The core obligation assumed by each of the NAALC parties is to "effectively enforce its 
labor law."7 This notion of "effective enforcement" of domestic labor law is the heart of 
the NAACL. While the countries have not yielded sovereignty with respect to the content 
of their laws or the authorities and procedures for enforcing them, they have transcended 
traditional notions of sovereignty by opening themselves to critical international and inde-
pendent reviews, evaluations, and even arbitrations over their performance in enforcing 
their labor laws. In three key areas — minimum wage, child labor, and occupational safety 
and health — the countries created a prospect of fines or loss of NAFTA trade benefits for a 
persistent pattern of failure to effectively enforce domestic law. 
The significance of this acquiescence to outside scrutiny should not be deprecated. 
Countries traditionally shield domestic sovereignty over labor law and labor-management 
relations. Indeed, labor law usually reflects a balance of forces resulting from decades of 
social struggle. The hybrid approach taken by the NAALC countries — preserving sover-
eignty over the levels of labor laws and standards, but submitting to reviews by each other 
by independent, non-governmental bodies — extends as far as countries can advance in 
fashioning the first labor accord connected to an international trade agreement. This is 
especially true where the United States dominates the economic relationship among the 
three NAFTA countries, where both Mexico and Canada see their own labor laws as more 
protective of workers than those of the United States and where smaller countries resist any 
move toward harmonization that would be influenced by the gravitational pull of U.S. eco-
nomic power. A fear already exists among labor rights advocates in Mexico and Canada 
that the U.S. deregulatory model of labor relations is advancing in their countries.8 
5. NAALC, supra note 1, art. 2. 
6. Id. art. 42. 
7. Id. art. 3(1). 
8. See Manuel Fuentes Muniz, The NAFTA Labor Accord in Mexico and Its Repercussions for Workers, 
10 CONN, j INT'L. 379-401 (1995). 
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A. THE LABOR PRINCIPLES OF THE NAALC. 
NAALC Annex 1 states that the United States, Mexico, and Canada "are committed to 
promote" the following labor principles while it emphasizes that the Parties "do not estab-
lish common minimum standards for their domestic law":9 
1) Freedom of association and protection of the right to organize 
2) The right to bargain collectively 
3) The right to strike 
4) Prohibition of forced labor 
5) Labor protections for children and young persons 
6) Minimum employment standards 
7) Elimination of employment discrimination 
8) Equal pay for women and men 
9) Prevention of occupational injuries and illnesses 
10) Compensation in cases of occupational injuries and illnesses 
11) Protection of migrant workers 
B. COUNTRIES' OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE NAALC. 
In Part Two of the NAALC, the three countries adopted six obligations in important 
areas of labor law and labor law enforcement.10 First, article 2 provides the levels of pro-
tection. It states that "[e]ach Party shall ensure that its labor laws and regulations provide 
for high labor standards, consistent with high quality and productivity workplaces, and 
shall continue to strive to improve those standards in that light."11 Second, article 3 
describes government enforcement action by providing that "[e]ach Party shall promote 
compliance with and effectively enforce its labor law through appropriate government 
action."12 Third, article 4 relates to private action in which "(e]ach Party shall ensure that 
persons with a legally recognized interest under its laws . . . have appropriate access to 
administrative . . . judicial or labor tribunals for the enforcement of the Party's labor 
law."13 Fourth, article 5 establishes procedural guarantees by stating that "[e]ach Party 
shall ensure that its . . . proceedings for the enforcement of its labor law are fair, equitable 
and transparent"14 Fifth, article 6 ensures publication of laws by stipulating that "[e]ach 
Party shall ensure that its laws regulations are publicly available and that proposed changes 
are published in advance and open to public comment."15 Sixth, article 7 discusses public 
information and awareness. The article states that "[e]ach Party shall promote public 
awareness of its labor law."16 
9. NAALC, supra note 1, at Annex 1. The full clause reads: "The following are guiding principles 
that the Parties are committed to promote, subject to each Party's domestic law, but do not estab-
lish common minimum standards for their domestic law. They indicate broad areas of concern 
where the Parties have developed, each in its own way, laws, regulations, procedures and practices 
that protect the rights and interests of their respective workforces." 
10. Id. arts. 2-7. 
11. Id. art. 2. 
12. id. art. 3. 
13. Wart.4. 
14. Id. art. 5. 
15. Id. art. 6. 
16. Id. art. 7. 
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C. STRUCTURE OF THE COMMISSION FOR LABOR COOPERATION. 
1. The Commission. 
A cabinet-level Ministerial Council and a permanent staff Secretariat make up the 
Commission for Labor Cooperation.17 The Council includes the Secretary (in the United 
States and Mexico) and the Minister (in Canada) of Labor of the three NAFTA countries. 
Acting as a single entity, the Council oversees the implementation of the NAALC and 
supervises the activities of the Secretariat.18 The Council also promotes trinational coop-
erative activities on a broad range of issues in the areas of labor law, labor standards, labor 
relations, and labor markets. •9 
The Commission's Secretariat, based in Dallas, Texas, began its operations in 
September, 1995.20 The Secretariat's fifteen member staff includes labor lawyers, econo-
mists, and other professionals experienced in labor affairs in their respective countries. 
They work in Spanish, French, and English. A senior Canadian labor ministry official, 
who negotiated the NAALC on behalf of the Canadian government, was named the first 
Executive Director of the Secretariat He is joined in Secretariat management by a senior 
U.S. director for labor law and economic research and a senior Mexican director for coop-
eration and evaluations.21 
The Executive Director and the international staff members are appointed for 3-year 
terms, subject to one renewal. Directorships rotated among nationals of the three coun-
tries. All directors and staff are international civil servants who may not take instructions 
from any government22 
The NAALC Labor Secretariat has two principal functions. First, it produces compar-
ative reports on labor laws and labor markets of the three countries, including special 
reports at the request of the Council. Second, the Secretariat serves as the general adminis-
trative arm of the Commission by providing staff support to the Council and to any 
Evaluation Committees of Experts or Arbitral Panels established under the Agreement.23 
2. National Administrative Offices (NAOs). 
The NAALC also requires each government to maintain a National Administrative 
Office (NAO) within the Labor Department of each country.24 The NAOs serve as points 
of contact and sources of information among themselves and other government agencies, 
with the Dallas-based Secretariat, and with the public.25 The NAOs also receive com-
17. Id. art. 8. 
18. Mart. 10. 
19. Mart. 11. 
20. See Jeffrey Hoffman, Setting Up Shop: NAFTA labor secretariat opens intergovernmental office in 
Dallas, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 9,1995, at ID. 
21. SeeCoMMissiON FOR LABOR COOPERATION, ANNUAL REPORT (1996). 
22. Mart. 12(5). 
23. Marts. 13-14. 
24. Mart. 15. 
25. Mart. 16. 
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plaints under the Agreement regarding labor law issues arising in another NAFTA 
country.26 This last feature is unusual but important; aggrieved workers, unions, or their 
allies must file their complaints with the NAO in another country, not their own, to initiate 
the review process. However, each NAO establishes its own domestic procedures for 
reviewing complaints for example, in the United States, procedures include public 
hearings27 while the Mexican NAO review process does not contemplate public hearings.28 
For matters involving any of the eleven labor principles, an NAO may recommend 
ministerial consultations at the Council level as part of its "report of review" in the matter. 
These consultations can be bi-lateral, between the country whose NAO issued the report 
and the country where alleged violations of workers' rights occurred, or they can be tri-lat-
eral, inviting the cabinet minister of the third country to participate in the consultation.29 
3. Evaluation Committees of Experts (ECEs). 
Following consultations in any matter, except one involving labor principles 1, 2 or 3, 
any Party may request that an independent Evaluation Committee of Experts (ECE) be 
established. The ECE must be formed upon such a request. However, a Party need not 
have made a prior complaint or obtained a NAO report in order to request ministerial 
consultations or the establishment of an ECE. Any minister may request consultation on 
any matter without a complaint having been filed and may initiate an ECE if the matter is 
susceptible to evaluation. However, in doing so, the requesting party opens its own record 
of labor law enforcement in the same subject matter to scrutiny by the ECE.30 
The ECEs may evaluate the record of both the country that is the object of the request 
and the country making the request in one or more of the following "technical labor stan-
dards,"31 depending on the scope of the request 
1) Prohibition of forced labor 
2) Labor protections for children and young persons 
3) Minimum employment standards 
4) Elimination of employment discrimination 
5) Equal pay for women and men 
6) Prevention of occupational injuries and illnesses 
7) Compensation in cases of occupational injuries and illnesses 
8) Protection of migrant workers 
4. Arbitral Panels for Dispute Resolution 
After an ECE report, if a country believes a persistent pattern of failure still existsby 
another country in effectively enforcing its occupational safety and health, child labor, or 
26. Id. art 16. Complaints are also called "public communications" or "submissions" in NAALC parlance. 
27. See Revised Notice of Establishment of United States National Administrative Office, 59 Fed. Reg. 
16,660-62(1994). 
28. See Mexico Secretariat of Labor and Social Welfare, What Is the Mexican National Administrative 
Office? (1996). 
29. NAALC, supra note 1, art. 22. 
30. 7d.art.23. 
31. Id. art. 23(2). 
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minimum wage technical labor standards, it may request the establishment of an indepen-
dent Arbitral Panel.32 After considering the matter, the Arbitral Panel may issue a ruling 
on which the parties may agree to an "action plan."33 If the action plan is not implement-
ed, the Panel may impose a monetary enforcement assessment against the offending gov-
ernment.34 The fine would be used to improve labor law enforcement in the Party com-
plained against.35 If the fine is not paid, trade sanctions may be applied.36 
D. STAGES OF TREATMENT AND SCOPE OF REVIEW. 
1. NAO Review and Ministerial Consultations. 
Subde but important distinctions emerge in the scope of review in the various stages 
of treatment of labor matters under the NAALC and in the ability to trigger the next stage 
of treatment. The scope of initial review by an NAO and ministerial consultations is 
extremely wide. For NAO review, the scope includes "labor law matters arising in the terri-
tory of another Party" while ministerial consultations review covers "any matter within the 
scope of this Agreement".37 The matter need not be related to NAFTA or to trade. 
Furthermore, failure to effectively enforce domestic law is not a necessary element for 
NAO review. 
NAO review also does not contain any "standing" requirement to file a complaint. 
Any citizen or organization of any country, alone or in coalition, may file a complaint 
with an NAO. The complaining party need not demonstrate harm or interest in the mat-
ter in order to have standing. The NAO must respond to the complaint either by accepting 
the complaint for review or, if it does not accept the complaint for review, by explaining in 
writing to the complainant the reasons for non-acceptance.38 
Beyond NAO review, however, the process becomes government-driven. Only the 
NAO may recommend ministerial consultations and only a minister can accept the recom-
mendation and request consultations. Furthermore, one minister may initiate the forma-
tion of an ECE39 while two ministers are necessary io initiate the formation of an arbitral 
panel.40 In this context, lobbying skills and political pressure are needed for the private 
parties to push their complaints forward through the process. 
2. ECE. 
Two new elements are needed for complaints to move to review by an ECE. First, the 
matter must be "trade-related " involving companies engaged in NAFTA trade or compet-
ing with traded goods or service from a NAFTA partner. Second, the matter must be cov-
32. 7d.art.27. 
33. Id. art. 38. 
34. Id. art. 39(4)(b); Annex 39. 
35. See id Annex 39(3). 
36. 7d.art.41. 
37. 7d. arts. 16(3)22. 
38. See supra notes 22,23 (The Canadian NAO is still formulating its guidelines). 
39. NAALC, supra note 1, art. 23. 
40. Id art. 29(1). 
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ered by "mutually recognized labor laws" meaning both countries have laws on the 
matter.41 For example, a U.S. or Canadian request for ECE review on a matter involving 
Mexico's law, which requires profit-sharing by all firms, might fail because no such law 
exists in the United States or Canada. 
The scope of an ECE's evaluation is narrower than that of an NAO review or minister-
ial consultation. Assuming that the matters are trade-related and covered by mutually rec-
ognized labor law, the NAALC specifies that the Committee "shall analyze, in the light of 
the objectives of this Agreement and in a non-adversarial manner, patterns of practice by 
each Party in the enforcement of its . . . technical labor standards [Labor Principles 4-
ll]."42 This introduces three additional factors: 
1) The exclusion of Labor Principles 1,2 and 3 from ECE treatment 
2) The need to examine "patterns of practice" rather than "labor law 
matters" or "any matter" 
3) The need to examine "enforcement" rather than "labor law matters" 
or "any matter" 
3. Dispute Resolution 
Dispute resolution by an arbitral panel entails the same requirements for trade-relat-
edness and mutually recognized labor laws. However, the NAALC contains an important 
new formulation of the scope of treatment by an arbitral panel: the "alleged persistent pat-
tern of failure to effectively enforce occupational safety and health, child labor or mini-
mum wage technical labor standards."43 This new formulation makes only 3 labor princi-
ples susceptible to dispute resolution. It also introduces the concept of a "persistent pat-
tern of failure to effectively enforce . . . labor standards." Issues characterized simply as 
"labor law matters" or "any matter" for NAO reviews and ministerial consultations, or 
"patterns of practice" and "enforcement" for ECE evaluation, face new, higher hurdles with 
arbitral review requiring findings of a "persistent pattern" and "failure to enforce" to 
obtain an arbitral panel ruling in favor of workers' rights. 
II. Experience Under the NAALC: The First Three Years. 
The first three years of experience under the NAALC were marked by an extensive 
program of cooperative activities, the first research reports by the Secretariat and its first 
international seminar, and the first complaints treated under the review and consultation 
process. 
A. COOPERATIVE ACTIVITIES. 
Cooperative activities included meetings and workshops among labor officials of the 
countries, exchanges of professional and technical delegations, and public seminars and 
conferences. They covered the following areas: 
41. Mart.23(3). 
42. Id. art. 23(2). 
43. I± art. 29(1). 
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1) Occupational safety and health matters, including particular 
attention to the construction, chemical and electronics 
industries 
2) Employment and job training 
3) Women in the workplace 
4) Non-standard work (temporary, part-time, independent 
contracting, home work etc.) 
5) Freedom of association and the right to organize 
6) Child labor 
7) Income security (unemployment insurance, pensions, workers' 
compensation etc.)44 
B. SECRETARIAT RESEARCH. 
In December, 1996, the Secretariat published a 40-page Preliminary Labor Law Report 
covering important elements of Labor Principles 1,2, and 3 in the three NAALC 
countries.45 This preliminary report anticipates a larger-scale Comparative Labor Law 
Report whose Volume I, to be published in 1997, analyzes the countries' labor and industri-
al relations laws in light of the six obligations of the NAALC. Later volumes will treat 
other Labor Principles. 
In June, 1997, the Secretariat issued the North American Labor Markets: A Comparative 
Profile, a report covering labor force demographics, changing employment structures and 
non-standard work patterns, unemployment and underemployment, earnings and pro-
ductivity, and other key labor market features of the continental economy. Enhanced by 
nearly one hundred charts and graphs, the report analyzes and presents a decade's worth 
of data from the three NAALC countries not available in any other source.46 
A third major study, in preparation by the Secretariat, looks at labor practices in the 
garment manufacturing industry. Due for publication later in 1997, this report examines 
how workers, unions, and firms in an important commercial sector are adjusting to new 
trade patterns in the post-NAFTA years. 
The Secretariat also produced a 120-page comparative study tided Plant Closings and 
Labor Rights in response to a special request from the Ministerial Council. The study 
examines the effects of plant closings and threats of plant closing on workers' right to 
organize in the United States, Canada, and Mexico. This report was requested as part of a 
program resulting from ministerial consultations in the Sprint case, described below.47 
44. See Commission for Labor Cooperation, supra note 23 (1995 & 1996). 
45. See SECRETARIAT OF THE COMMISSION FOR LABOR COOPERATION, PRELIMINARY REPORT TO THE 
MINISTERIAL COUNCIL: LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS LAWS IN CANADA, THE UNITED STATES, AND 
MEXICO (Dec. 1996). 
46. See SECRETARIAT OF THE COMMISSION FOR LABOR COOPERATION, NORTH AMERICAN LABOR MARKETS: 
A COMPARATIVE PROFILE (1997). 
47. See SECRETARIAT OF THE COMMISSION FOR LABOR COOPERATION, PLANT CLOSINGS AND LABOR RIGHTS 
(1997). 
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C. COMPLAINTS AND CASES. 
1. Honeywell and General Electric. 
In February, 1994, two U.S. unions, the International Brotherhood of Teamsters and 
the United Electrical Workers, filed complaints with the U.S. NAO alleging discharge of 
workers for attempting to form unions at the Mexican maquiladora facilities of two major 
multinational corporations. Citing violations of labor principle 1 and the failure of 
Mexican labor law authorities to adequately protect the right to organize, the unions 
charged that several workers were discharged for union activity at an electronic control 
plant of Honeywell Corp. in Chihuahua and at an electric motor plant of the General 
Electric (G.E.) Co. in Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua.48 
The U.S. NAO accepted the complaints for review in April, 1994, and held a public 
hearing in Washington, D.C. on the matter in September, 1994. Workers from the 
Honeywell and G.E. factories in Mexico testified at the hearing, along with Mexican labor 
lawyers and U.S. union representatives. Neither of the companies appeared at the 
hearing.49 
The U.S. NAO's Public Report of Review of October 12, 1994, noted that its review 
"reveals disagreements about the events at the each of the plants," namely whether workers 
were fired because of union activity or for lawful reasons unrelated to union activity. The 
NAO, while making no finding on the reasons for the workers' discharge, noted that "the 
timing of the dismissals appears to coincide with organizing drives by independent unions 
at both plants." The NAO also cited "other relevant issues" including "difficulties in estab-
lishing unions in Mexico, the hurdles faced by independent unions in attaining legal recog-
nition, company blacklisting of union activists . . . and government preference for and sup-
port of official unions"50 However, the NAO declared itself "not in a position to make a 
finding that the Government of Mexico failed to enforce the relevant labor laws," noting 
that the dismissed workers' acceptance of severance pay as indemnization for relinquishing 
their legal claims was in keeping with Mexican labor law.51 
The NAO report did not recommendation ministerial consultations, but rather it 
called for a series of cooperative activities coordinated by die NAOs of the three NAALC 
parties regarding freedom of association and protection of the right to organize as a result, 
in March and September, 1995, trinational government-to-government workshops were 
held in Washington, D.C. where experts from each country's labor authorities engaged in 
discussions regarding union organizing and representation issues, protection against anti 
union discrimination, procedural guarantees, and union democracy issues.52 
48. U.S. NAO, Case Nos. 940001,940002. 
49. See Lance A. Compa, The First NAFTA Labor Cases: A New International Labor Rights Regime 
Takes Shape, 3 U.S. MEXICO L. J. 159-181 (1995). 
50. See US. NAO, Public Report of Review, NAO Submission #940001 ar.d NAO Submission #940002 
(Bureau of International Labor Affairs, U.S. Dept of Labor, Oct. 12,1994), at 28-30. 
51. Id. at 30-31. 
52. Transcripts and papers from these conferences are available from the U.S. National 
Administrative Office, Bureau of International Labor Affairs, U.S. Department of Labor, 
Washington, D.C. 
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As a result of these activities, prompted by the Honeywell and G.E. cases, a trinational 
conference on industrial relations in the 21st century was held in Montreal, Quebec in 
March, 1996. The conference brought together representatives of government, labor, and 
business, as well as academics and other researchers. The conference included discussions 
of freedom of association and protection of the right to organize, but extended beyond 
them to take up issues of new employment structures and the challenge they present to 
union organizing and representation in years ahead. 
2. Sony. 
In August, 1994, a coalition of four labor support groups in the United States and 
Mexico filed a complaint alleging discharge of workers and discrimination against dissi-
dent unionists at a Mexican maquiladora facility in Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas of the Sony 
Corporation, which manufactures video cassette recorder magnetic tapes.53 The 
International Labor Rights Fund, the Coalition for Justice in the Maquiladoras, the 
American Friends Service Committee, and the Asociacidn National de Abogados 
Democrdticos of Mexico cited collusion between management, the incumbent union, and 
local political leaders in crushing an attempt to elect new leaders and to form a new union 
at the plant. 
In October, 1994, the U.S. NAO accepted the complaint for review and in February, 
1995, the NAO conducted a public hearing in $an Antonio, Texas, during which Mexican 
workers, their attorneys, and U.S. supporters spoke. Citing "serious questions" on union 
registration issues, the U.S. NAO recommended ministerial consultations in a Public 
Report of Review dated April 11,1995.54 Ensuing consultations resulted in a program of 
activities including trinational workshops and public conferences in Mexico and in the 
United States on union registration and certification, a special study by independent 
Mexican labor law experts dealing with union registration and its implementation, and a 
series of meetings by officials of the Mexican Department of Labor and Social Welfare with 
Sony workers, local labor authorities, and company representatives. 
Additionally, seminars on union registration and certification procedures were held 
with public participation in Mexico City, D.F. and San Antonio, Texas in September and 
November, 1995, respectively and in Monterrey, Nuevo Leon in February, 1996. In 
February, 1996, the Mexican NAO published documents related to the seminars, the spe-
cial study by independent experts, and the meetings called for in the agreement on minis-
terial consultations. Furthermore, in June, 1996, the U.S. NAO released a report summa-
rizing and analyzing the results of the seminars and other aspects of the program resulting 
from ministerial consultations in Submission No. 94003.55 The U.S. Secretary of Labor 
directed the NAO to monitor developments in Mexico regarding union registration and to 
report on the implications of decisions by the Supreme Court of Mexico on constitutional 
issues involving union registration in the public sector. 
53. U.S. NAO Case No. 940003. 
54. See U.S. NAO, Public Report of Review, NAO Submission #940003 (Bureau of International Labor 
Affairs, US.Dept. of Labor, Apr. 11,1995). 
55. See U.S. NAO, Report on Ministerial Consultations on NAO Submission #940003 Under the North 
American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (Bureau of International Labor Affairs, U.S. Dept. of 
Labor, June 4,1995). 
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In December, 1996, the U.S. NAO delivered the follow-up report requested by the 
Secretary. The follow-up report discussed the current status of Sony workers, initiatives in 
Mexico to change the labor law, and decisions of the Mexican Supreme Court The report 
concluded that "potentially significant development continue to take place in Mexico in a 
wide range of labor matters, including labor legislation, labor-management relations, 
labor-government relations, and within labor organizations themselves. The extent of the 
impact of the developments discussed above, however, remains to be seen."56 
3. Sprint. 
The Sindicato de Telefonistas de la Republica Mexkana (STRM) filed a complaint with 
the NAO of Mexico in February, 1995. The complaint arose after the sudden closing of a 
Spanish-language telemarketing facility of the Sprint Corporation in San Francisco, 
California alleged to be motivated by anti-union bias.57 The STRM collaborated with its 
U.S. counterpart, the Communications Workers of America (CWA), which was the union 
seeking to organize the Sprint facility.58 
The NAO of Mexico accepted the complaint for review and issued a Report on May 
31, 1995. The report concluded that it was "concerned about the effectiveness of certain 
measures intended to guarantee [freedom of association and the right of workers to orga-
nize]" and "possible problems in the effective application of U.S. law," and recommended 
ministerial consultations in the matter.59 Ensuing consultations resulted in an agreement 
among the labor secretaries of Mexico and the United States and the labor minister of 
Canada dated February 13, 1996, which called for a three part program. First, a public 
forum was to be held in San Francisco, California. Second, the Secretariat was to create a 
special report on the effects of sudden plant closings on the principle of freedom of associ-
ation and protection of the right to organize in the three countries. Third, the Secretary of 
Labor of the United States was to provide to the Secretary of Labor of Mexico updates on 
developments in proceedings under U.S. domestic labor law of the case that prompted the 
submission and the ministerial consultations. 
On February 27, 1996, the public forum called for by the ministers was held in San 
Francisco with presentations by workers affected by the plant closing, by union representa-
tives from the STRM and the CWA, and by unionists from Germany and Great Britain. 
Testimony was also offered by a law professor speaking on behalf of Sprint and by acade-
mic analysts. In December, 1996, the U.S. National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) ruled 
that the plant closing by Sprint was motivated by anti-union animus and ordered the 
employer to rehire affected workers into openings in other divisions of the company and 
to provide back pay for lost wages. Sprint appealed the NLRB decision and the case is cur-
rently pending in the courts.60 
56. See U.S. NAO, Follow-Up Report, NAO Submission #940003 (Bureau of International Labor 
Affairs, U.S. Dept. of Labor, Dec. 4,1996, at 10). 
57. See Case No. 9501. OAN MEX (Mexican National Administrative Office, Department of Labor 
and Social Welfare, Feb. 9,1995). 
58. Id. 
59. See NAO of Mexico, Informe sobre la Revisidn de la Comunkaddn Publica 9501 / OAN MEX 
(Mexican National Administrative Office, Department of Labor and Social Welfare, May 31,1995). 
60. See LCF, Inc., d/b/a La Conexion Familiar and Sprint Corporation, 322 N.L.R.B. 137 (1996). 
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In June, 1997, the Secretariat issued its special report titled Plant Closings and Labor 
Rights.61 The report reviewed administrative tribunal and court decisions in the United 
States, Canada, and Mexico dealing with plants closings and threats of plant closing to 
resist union organizing efforts by workers. The report found that such anti-union tactics 
are widespread in the United States but less prevalent in the other countries; in Canada, it 
is less prevalent due to stronger enforcement, and in Mexico, due to differences in the 
union organizing system, which rarely involves an election "campaign" where threats of 
closing or decisions to close are made. 
4. Pesca Union. 
In June, 1996, the International Labor Rights Fund, Human Rights Watch/Americas, 
and the Asotiacidn National deAbogados Democrdticos filed a complaint with the U.S. NAO 
on behalf of the Sindicato Unico de Trabajadores de la Secretaria de Pesca (SUTSP), a union 
that had long represented employees of the Mexican fisheries ministry. The union lost its 
representation rights when the fisheries ministry merged into a new, larger ministry of 
environment, natural resources, and fisheries.62 
The complaint alleged that the new ministry and the labor authorities improperly 
revoked its union registration and granted recognition and favorable treatment to a rival 
union. The complaint raised issues concerning the federal labor law requirement prohibit-
ing more than one union in a governmental entity. This was cited by complainants as a 
violation of ILO Convention 87, which under the Mexican Constitution is part of the 
country's domestic law. Complainants also charged that the participation in the tripartite 
Junta de Conciliacidn y Arbitraje of union representatives, who might have a conflict of 
interest in ruling on disputes with another union, violated the NAALC's requirement for 
impartial labor tribunals. 
The U.S. NAO accepted the petition for review in August, 1996. It held a public hear-
ing in Washington, D.C. in December, 1996, with statements by representatives of the sub-
mitting organizations, by union representatives and counsel from the contending union 
organizations, by interested public citizens, and by a representative of the Mexican 
Department of Labor and Social Welfare. As part of its review, the U.S. NAO also commis-
sioned special studies on labor law enforcement in the federal sector. 
On January 27, 1997, the U.S. NAO issued a Public Report of Review that recom-
mended ministerial consultations on relevant legal doctrines in Mexico, including the 
effects on Mexican labor law of constitutional provisions assuring freedom of association, 
"for the purpose of examining the relationship between and the effect of international 
treaties, such as ILO Convention 87, and constitutional provisions on freedom of associa-
tion on the national labor laws of Mexico."63 
61. See supra note 40. 
62. See U.S. NAO, Case No. 9601. 
63. See U.S. NAO, Public Report of Review, NAO Submission #9601 (Bureau of International Labor 
Affairs, U.S. Dept. of Labor, Jan. 27,1997). 
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5. Maxi-Switch. 
In a mirror image of the Sprint case, CWA filed a complaint with the U.S. NAO in 
October, 1996, together with the STRM and its union federation.64 The complaint alleged 
that workers' attempt to organize a union affiliated with the STRM at the Maxi-Switch 
facility in Cananea, Sonora was thwarted by a collusive "contract of protection" between 
the company and another union affiliated with the dominant union federation. Maxi-
Switch, a computer keyboard manufacturer, is a subsidiary of the Silitek corporation of 
Taipei, Taiwan. The complaint argued that the contract was made without employees' 
knowledge or consent and that the local Junta de Conciliacidn y Arbitraje improperly 
denied registration to the STRM group.65 
In December, 1996, the U.S. NAO accepted the submission for review and scheduled a 
public hearing in the matter in Tucson, Arizona on April 18, 1997. Testimony was to be 
received from Maxi-Switch workers and from representatives of the CWA and the STRM. 
However, on April 15,1997, the CWA withdrew the submission at the request of the STRM 
because the labor authorities in Mexico took steps to resolve the matter to the satisfaction 
of the STRM, including granting registration to the STRM-affiliated union. The public 
hearing was canceled.66 Following these events, the "Forista" movement of independent 
unions in Mexico announced a plan to launch large-scale organizing drives in the 
maquiladora manufacturing areas. As one leader said, "we have initiated the fight against 
'protection contracts' and 'white unions' in the maquiladora."67 
6. Pregnancy Discrimination in the Maquiladora. 
Two U.S.-based human rights groups and an association of Mexican attorneys filed a 
complaint with the NAO of the United States on May 15,1997, alleging "a pattern of wide-
spread, state-tolerated sex discrimination against prospective and actual female workers in 
the maquiladora sector along the Mexico-U.S. border." 6 8 The complaint involved an 
alleged common practice of requiring pregnancy testing of all female job applicants and 
denying employment to those whose test results are positive, and of pressuring employees 
who become pregnant while working to leave their jobs, all to avoid the legal requirement 
of three months' fully-paid maternity leave for workers who give birth. 
The submitters argued that the practice by employers and the failure of the labor 
authorities to combat it—sometimes by omission, sometimes by overt support for the 
employers' discriminatory policy—violates Mexico's obligations under the NAALC. The 
complaint sought a U.S. NAO review, public hearings in cities along the Mexico-U.S. bor-
der, and the formation of an Evaluation Committee of Experts to report on employment 
64. See US. NAO, Case. No. 9602. 
65. Id, 
66. See Pamelah M. Prah, CWA Drops NAFTA Charge After Mexico Recognizes Workers' Independent 
Union, BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS DAILY LABOR REPORT, Apr. 17,1997, at A7. 
67. See John Nagel, Mexican Labor Group Calls for Action Following Victory in Maxi-Switch 
Campaign, BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS DAILY LABOR REPORT, Apr. 28,1997, at A4. 
68. See U.S. NAO Case No. 9701, "Submission Concerning Pregnancy-Based Sex Discrimination in 
Mexico's Maquiladora Sector," at 4 (filed by Human Rights Watch/Americas, International Labor 
Rights Fund, and Associacion Nacional de Abogados'Democraticos). 
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practices related to pregnancy in the three NAALC countries.69 At this writing, the U.S. 
NAO is considering whether to accept the case for review. 
D. ANALYSIS. 
Analyzing NAFTA's labor side agreement is a 2-track exercise. One track follows the 
experience within the institutional framework of the NAALC. A second track follows 
actions outside this framework in the form of cross border organizing and related efforts 
by unions, human rights organizations and related advocacy groups. 
1. Track I: Using the NAALC. 
Experience within the structures created by the NAALC reflects unrealized potential. 
Only six cases were filed under the NAALC in its first three years of operation.70 All of 
them involved the first eleven principles on union organizing matters, and they stopped at 
the first level of review, NAO review and optional ministerial consultations. 
Critics assailed the NAALC for failing to achieve reinstatement of dismissed workers 
or recognition of independent unions.71 However, such criticism misapprehends the 
power of the NAALC for it cannot substitute for domestic labor law. None of the three 
countries were prepared to have a new supranational body dictate remedies to its domestic 
authorities. Instead, the NAALC creates a new setting for international scrutiny of labor 
law matters in hopes that over time, the "sunlight" effect of such scrutiny can change the 
climate of respect for workers' rights.72 
The NAALC cases have had some concrete results as well as some that can only be con-
jectured. In the GE and Honeywell cases, some workers were reinstated, and those compa-
nies, along with others in the region, have instructed their managers to avoid putting them in 
a position of having new complaints filed against them — that is, to not fire workers for orga-
nizing. At least some companies appear to be more cautious in targeting workers for dis-
missal.73 In the Sony case, independent trade union advocates acknowledged that the public 
conferences and events surrounding the ministerial consultation program gave them an 
international audience that sustained their organizing effort74 
Similarly, Sprint workers have maintained their union organization, fueled in part by 
knowing that, in addition to their domestic labor board case, they have international sup-
port and an international organization reporting on plant closings and union organizing 
in the three countries.75 In the Maxi-Switch case, the NAALC filing and the prospect of 
69. Mat37-39. 
70. Id. 
71. See Jerome I. Levinson, NAFTA's Labor Agreement: Lessons From the First Three Years, INSTITUTE 
FOR POLICY STUDIES AND THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR RIGHTS FUND, NOV. 12,1996, at 3 (calling the 
NAALC "a fatally flawed agreement"). 
72. Id. 
73. See Dora Delgado, NAOs Deterring Would-Be Violators of Labor Laws, Mexican Official Says, in 
BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS DAILY LABOR REPORT, Oct 25,1995, at A13. 
74. See Dora Delgado, Jury Should Remain Out on Power of Labor Side Accord, Officials Say, in BUREAU 
OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS DAILY LABOR REPORT, Mar. 4,1996, at Cl. 
75. See U.S. Union Hails NAFTA Labor Ministers Agreement in Sprint Case, INSIDE NAFTA, Dec. 27, 
1995, at 10. 
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public hearings and potential ministerial consultations clearly contributed to the resolu-
tion of the matter to the satisfaction of the unions involved.76 Even the prospect of a 
NAALC case can have effects. In Canada, the province of Alberta withdrew a plan to pri-
vatize labor standards enforcement after trade unions announced they would file a com-
plaint under the NAALC with the NAOs of the United States and Mexico.77 
Labor board and court decisions have also taken favorable turns in NAALC-related 
cases. In the Pesca case, the independent union had its registration restored by court order 
and it still enjoys personalidad juridica.78 In the Sprint case, the U.S. NLRB reversed the 
administrative judge, who heard the evidence, and ruled in Sprint's favor on the plant closing 
issue. The NLRB ruled that the company closed the plant because of anti-union motivation, 
not for economic reasons, and ordered that the workers be rehired. It would be too much to 
claim a cause-and-effect relationship between the NAALC and these decisions, but the new 
international accountability demanded by the NAALC was certainly part of the context79 
Only one case involving any of the other 10 Principles has been initiated, and it is too 
soon at this writing to know whether it has been accepted for review. Further the NAALC 
Evaluation procedure has not been invoked, nor has the Arbitration mechanism been put 
to the test. In sum, one subject matter — organizing — has been treated at the stage one 
Review level, when the potential exists for three subjects —organizing, bargaining and 
striking — to get such first-level treatment. Five other subjects — forced labor, equal pay, 
non-discrimination, workers' compensation and migrant labor — can get two levels of 
treatment, Review and Evaluation. Three more — child labor, minimum wages and safety 
and health -- can get all three levels of treatment: Review, Evaluation and Arbitration. 
Experience with just one of a possible twenty-two combinations of subject and treatment 
cannot be a basis for conclusions about the NAALC's worth. 
The potential use of an ECE is especially interesting. Eight topics are susceptible to an 
ECE under the NAALC. The ECE procedure is deliberately non accusatory. It can be initi-
ated by one government alone, as long as that government is willing to open up its own 
enforcement record in the subject matter being evaluated. But government officials do not 
undertake the evaluation. Rather, an independent panel of experts from the three coun-
tries undertake their own comparative analysis, reports, and recommendations. 
The NAALC's ECE mechanism could be a powerful tool for promoting effective labor 
law enforcement. Interested unions, employers, or other groups could call to their govern-
ment's attention problems that might lend themselves to a ministerial request for an ECE. 
Collaborating across borders, such groups could encourage all the governments to under-
take an ECE in a recognized area of common concern. Beyond that, they could ask for 
cases implicating child labor, minimum wage, or occupational safety and health issues to 
advance beyond Evaluation to the Dispute Resolution level of treatment, if two govern-
76. See Prah, supra note 57. 
77. See Provinces Halt of Privatization Plan Ends Looming NAFTA Complaint, INSIDE NAFTA, Dec. 25, 
1996, at 14; Allan Chambers, Privatization of labor rules raises fears: Law may face NAFTA chal-
lenge, EDMONTON JOURNAL, Sept. 6,1996, at 1. 
78. See U.S. NAO, supra note 55. 
79. The Sprint Corp. has appealed the NLRB's decision to the federal courts of appeals. 
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merits agree to carry such cases forward. However, only one case susceptible to ECE treat-
ment has been brought.80 
2. Track II: Cross-Border Organizing. 
A key outgrowth of the NAFTA labor side accord is an unprecedented increase in 
exchange, communication, and collaboration among labor rights advocates and labor 
researchers at the trinational level. Under the NAALC's unusual cross-cutting procedures, 
complaints involving practices in one country must be initiated in or by another country. 
Thus, trade unionists and their allies are compelled to collaborate across North American 
borders to use the NAALC. 
Even before NAFTA, the United Electrical Workers union (UE) and the Mexican Frente 
Autentico de Trabajo (FAT) fashioned a strategic organizing alliance.81 The Teamsters union 
and the FAT undertook similar efforts without the formality of a written agreement. 
Furthermore, the Communications Workers of America (CWA) developed close ties with 
the Sindicato de Telefonistas de la Republica Mexicana (STRM), the national telephone work-
ers union of Mexico.82 The ILGWU and ACTWU, now joined in the new union UNITE, 
have carried out joint programs with unions in Mexico and Canada. In one "twin plant" set-
ting with unionized shops in Eagle Pass, Texas and Piedras Negras, Coahuila, for example, 
the UNITE local collaborated with its Mexican counterpart to achieve key contract gains in 
both factories. On a broader scale, the Texas state AFL-CIO has formed a Border Solidarity 
Committee to work with Mexican unions in the border region. 
The UE and Teamsters filed the first NAFTA labor cases with the U.S. NAO on behalf of 
Mexican workers involved in FAT organizing efforts. The Sony case was filed by a coalition 
of four groups: the Washington-based International Labor Rights Fund, the Texas-based 
Coalition for Justice in the Maquiladoras, and American Friends Service Committee 
Maquiladora Project, along with the Mexican National Association of Democratic Lawyers. 
Assistance flows both ways, though. For example, the Mexican STRM filed the Sprint 
complaint on behalf of workers being organized in California by the CWA.83 In 1995, FAT 
organizers helped the UE win an organizing victory at a large manufacturing plant in 
Milwaukee, Wisconsin with a high complement of migrant Mexican workers.84 Mexican 
workers, union organizers, and labor lawyers testified in public hearings in the United 
States on the G.E., Honeywell, and Sony cases. Mexican, U.S., and Canadian labor, democ-
80. For a discussion of the first six cases, see Roy J. Adams & Parbudyal Singh, Early Experience With 
NAFTA's Labour Side Accord, 18 COMP. LAB. L. J. 161, 181 (1997) (concluding that "Each of the 
three nations has formally committed itself to follow policies that will result in the effective 
attainment of a robust list of labour rights. It is now up to organized labour and its allies to hold 
those nations to their word by using the accord to the fullest extent possible,"). 
81. See the UE-FAT Strategic Organizing Alliance: Statement of Joint Work (Feb. 1992), declaring a 
purpose of "exploring new forms of international labor solidarity in the struggle to improve liv-
ing and working conditions on both sidesof the border." Id, 
82. See John Cusick, U.S. and Mexican Telecom Unions Build North American Labor Solidarity, CWA 
NEWS,Nov./Dec.l995,at 10. 
83. See Carey Goldberg, U.S. Labor Making Use of Trade Accord It Fiercely Opposed, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
28,1996, at Al. 
84. See Terry Davis, Cross-Border Organizing Comes Home: UE and FAT in Mexico and Milwaukee, 23 
LAB. RESEARCH REV. 23 (1995). 
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racy, and human rights advocates spoke out at public forums held by the U.S. and Mexican 
labor departments on union registration matters as part of the Sony case consultation. U.S. 
and Mexican unionists were joined by leaders of the Canadian, German, and British tele-
phone workers unions in the public forum inspired by the Sprint case under the NAALC. 
All these steps required careful coordination to shape common positions. As those 
involved begin to know each other better, contacts will proliferate. Currently, trade 
unionists and union economists, lawyers, and other staffers from the three NAALC coun-
tries regularly send delegates to each others' conventions, conferences, and other activities. 
They are trading bargaining information, translating papers and studies, and finding new 
ways to link their movements. While it is not only the labor side agreement driving these 
actions, the NAALC creates a framework for concrete work, including developing strate-
gies, drafting submissions, planning testimony, writing press releases, setting up demon-
strations, meeting with government officials, participating in the NAALC's cooperative 
activities program and events that flow from ministerial consultations, and all the learning 
about each other's countries and labor movements that goes with them. 
Additionally, outside organized labor, a multitude of labor-allied non governmental 
organizations in the three countries have been conducting a series of trinational confer-
ences, workshops, research projects, and other bridge-building efforts for the past five 
years to press for a strengthened social dimension in North American economic integra-
tion. However, few of these efforts would have been undertaken outside the NAFTA con-
text, and the NAALC provides concrete opportunity for more joint work.85 
E. CONCLUSION. 
Any number of idealized "social charters" with universal standards and swift, powerful 
enforcement powers could be drafted by critics of the labor side agreement. But the 
NAALC was negotiated by sovereign governments with clashing business, labor, and politi-
cal concerns. The result is a hybrid agreement, one that preserves sovereignty but creates 
mutual obligations and combines broad cooperation and consultation programs alongside 
contentious review, evaluation, and dispute resolution mechanisms. Most of all, the 
NAALC promotes engagement on labor rights and labor standards in an experiment not 
tested in any other international forum. 
85. Key NGO actors in such coalitions include, for the United States: the International Labor Rights 
Fund (ILRF), the Alliance for Responsible Trade (ART), the Citizens Trade Campaign (CTC), the 
Development Group for Alternative Policies (D-GAP), the Institute for Policy Studies (IPS), the 
Coalition for Justice in the Maquiladoras (CJM), the American Friends Service Committee 
(AFSC), Bread for the World, Mexico-US Dialogos, the Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy 
(IATP), the Inter-Hemispheric Education Research Center, the Resource Center of the Americas, 
the Tennessee Industrial Renewal Network (TIRN), and various academic centers; for Mexico: 
the Red Mexicana de Accion Frente al Libre Comercio (RMALC), the research groups Equipo 
Pueblo and FLACSO, the Asociacion National de Abogados Democraticos, Mujeres Trabajadores 
Unidas, and a number of university research centers; for Canada: the Action Canada Network 
(ACN), the Canadian Center for Policy Alternatives (CCPA), the International Centre for Human 
Rights and Democratic Development (ICHRDD), the North-South Institute, the Steelworkers 
Humanity Fund, and the group Common Frontiers. 
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In principle, a labor rights accord linked to a trade agreement, such as NAFTA, ought 
to provide for universal standards and eventual harmonization of labor standards — taking 
labor out of competition, in the classic formulation. But this is not easy when wide eco-
nomic disparity exists among the countries negotiating a trade and labor accord, and a sin-
gle country accounts for 85 percent of the economic activity in the trade area. 
In the NAFTA context, a threshold problem of sovereignty concerns all three coun-
tries. These are not just concerns of government officials; they are deeply held in all sec-
tors of society, including trade unions and social activist communities. Many Mexican and 
Canadian labor policy analysts look at the state of U.S. labor law and the U.S. labor move-
ment and recoil at the prospect of homogenized labor laws. They are not about to give up 
laws created by their own representatives, administered by agencies accountable to their 
own executive branches, and reviewed by their own judiciary, to a new supranational 
agency that might be dominated by the overwhelming economic interests of the United 
States. 
The approach taken in the NAALC, emphasizing "effective enforcement" of domestic 
labor law, is a more practical starting point than attempting to fashion common norms. 
Any system of law is only as good as its system of enforcement. U.S. experience with a 
resurgent sweatshop industry in major American cities should give pause to demands that 
Mexico, or any developing country, "raise" its standards to the levels of industrialized 
countries before enforcement is strengthened in every country.86 
Instead of yielding sovereignty over the content of their labor laws and standards, the 
NAFTA countries shaped the NAALC to open themselves up to trinational scrutiny of 
their enforcement regimes. Such scrutiny is conducted under the NAALC's Review 
process, through special studies by the Secretariat, and through Evaluation and Dispute 
Resolution by independent, non-governmental experts who are free to reach their own 
conclusions about the effectiveness of countries' labor laws. This is an extraordinary 
degree of candor in international relations, in contrast to traditional sovereignty rules. It 
should not be scorned because it fails to achieve a supposed ideal of international fair 
labor standards and swift, sure punishment powers having massive implications for 
national sovereignty and domestic legal structures. 
86. See William Branigin, Reaping Abuse for What They Sew; Sweatshops Once Again Commonplace in 
U.S. Garment Industry, WASH. POST, Feb. 16,1997, at Al. 
